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Abstract
Is there any role for regional organisations in the maintenance of international 
peace and security and if so, how effective are they? This question has polarised 
the debate on the role and potential contribution of regional intergovernmental 
collective security organisations in the maintenance of international peace 
and security in the post-Cold War period. Some scholars argue that regional 
organisations play only a limited role and that even when they do so, it is often 
in pursuit of their political or strategic self-interests. On the other hand, some 
academics and policy practitioners are of the view that regional organisations not 
only have a role to play but have emerged as a viable framework for the maintenance 
of regional peace and security. In the process, they have ‘rescued’ the global 
institution, the United Nations, in its mandate to maintain international peace 
and security. The case of the West African peacekeeping and conflict stabilisation 
interventions and regional deployments have been cited as a reflection of this 
development, despite its many problems and challenges. If this is the case, what 
has been the role and contribution of ECOWAS (the Economic Community of 
* David J. Francis is Professor of African Peace and Conflict Studies at the University of 
Bradford. This article is made possible due to the research support of the London School 
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West African States) integration in regional peace, security, conflict prevention, 
management and resolution? 
Introduction
This article critically outlines the role and contribution of ECOWAS (the 
Economic Community of West African States) regionalism to peace and security 
and examines the core factors that determine its effectiveness. It will do so by 
exploring how the West African sub-region has emerged as the new theatre of 
violent intra-state conflicts and a ‘bad neighbourhood’ in Africa. To understand 
the imperatives for the expansion of the sub-regional economic co-operation 
entity into security regionalism, concomitant with the evolution of a regional 
peacekeeping and conflict management capability, it is important to start with a 
political economy analysis of West Africa. Building on this, the article examines 
the experience of ECOWAS regional peacekeeping, peace support operators and 
conflict stabilisation interventions in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and 
Côte d’Ivoire. The primary focus is to provide an understanding of the emergence 
of a regional peace, security and conflict management architecture in West 
Africa and how this has developed from ad hoc improvisation in response to the 
challenges of violent conflicts in the sub-region and to the evolution of a nascent 
regional co-operative ethos underpinned by the ‘Try Africa First’ approach. 
The core argument of this article is that the West African sub-region is a violent 
and ‘bad neighbourhood’ with weak and collapsed states that ‘habitually’ 
intervene (by both military and non-military means) in member states. Therefore, 
one cannot expect too much from ECOWAS in terms of effectiveness in peace 
and security,1 in particular, if we define ‘peace’ as not only the mere absence of 
war but also the elimination of all conditions that cause human suffering such 
as structural, cultural and physical violence. In addition, if we define ‘security’ 
in military and non-military terms, it becomes obvious that any pretence of 
1 From a neo-realist perspective, John Mearsheimer (1994:33) argues that ‘institutions have 
minimal influence on state behaviour and thus hold little promise of promoting stability 
and inter-state co-operation in the post-Cold War world’. Robert Keohane (1994) outlines 
two important approaches to understanding the role of international institutions and the 
potential contribution of multilateral organisations to the maintenance of international 
peace and security. 
89
Peacekeeping in a bad neighbourhood: ECOWAS in peace and security in West Africa
ECOWAS to effectiveness in peace and security is far above and beyond the 
capacity of the regional organisation.2 In simple terms, are we not demanding 
too much of a regional organisation to deliver the multi-faceted and multi-level 
dimensions of peace and security? If this is the case, this article therefore focuses 
only on one aspect of ECOWAS’ peace and security, i.e. ECOWAS Ceasefire 
Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) military operations and in particular the 
ECOWAS-ECOMOG ad hoc peacekeeping and peace support operations in the 
sub-region. This focus is important because it is in this area that ECOWAS has 
registered some positive impact on regional peace and security. Furthermore, 
the specific focus on ECOMOG’s military and peacekeeping activities provides 
the basis to evaluate the wider effectiveness of ECOWAS in peace and security.
‘Bad neighbourhood’ and the regionalisation of civil wars: 
Political economy of West Africa
The popular, if not, iconic image of West Africa, as presented by the international 
media, is that of a region plagued by bloody civil wars and state collapse with 
drug-crazed, gun-totting child soldiers on the rampage – all in the midst of 
humanitarian disaster. In fact, the West African sub-region was portrayed in 1994 
by Robert Kaplan (1994) as having the potential to become the ‘real strategic 
danger’ threatening international peace and security. The question is: why West 
Africa? The ‘geographical expression’ that is described as West Africa is a diverse 
and complex geo-political and social construction, with an estimated population 
of 235 million (2003), accounting for approximately 32 per cent of Africa’s 
total population. The region comprises sixteen geographically proximate and 
contiguous states that have emerged as a distinct political and socio-economic 
entity and a territorial sub-system. The diversity of West Africa is reflected in 
its political history with an Anglophone, Francophone and Lusophone colonial 
2 See Ernst Haas (1994), David J. Francis (2006a and 2006b). In general, traditional 
co-operation theories such as neo-liberal institutionalism (including the functional 
integration theories of the 1940s and 50s, the neo-functional regional integration theory 
of the 1950s and 60s, and the interdependence/complex interdependence theory of the 
1970s) have argued in several ways that international institutions and organisations 
can facilitate inter-state (security) co-operation or limit the constraining effects of the 
‘anarchic international system’ (Keohane 1982). 
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divide,3 and with socio-cultural, ethnic and linguistic differences. The colonial 
legacies and their accompanying diverse political and administrative orientations 
of West African states have often led to political disputes and tensions, to the 
extent that political leaders are suspicious of the intentions of their counterparts 
if they are not from the same ‘colonial bloc’. The colonial divide and diversity 
have often played themselves out in the arena of West African intra-regional 
co-operation and international affairs. The similarity shared by the majority of 
West African countries is that they are generally described as least developed 
or underdeveloped states in terms of their level of economic development and 
social progress (United Nations Development Programme 2006). 
In addition, European imperialism and colonialism in West Africa have left a 
legacy of external dependence with largely cash crop, agrarian and extractive-
based economies relying heavily on Multinational Corporations (MNCs) 
for the exploitation of these strategic resources. Agricultural products are the 
primary foreign exchange earners for the majority of the countries, whilst others 
depend on strategic mineral resources such as diamonds, gold, bauxite, iron ore, 
tin, zinc, copper, uranium, liquefied natural gas and oil (Nigeria is a leading 
oil producer). Despite the vast mineral resource endowment, the sub-region 
has not been able to convert its strategic resources into sustainable economic 
growth, development and social progress. 
The West African sub-region, since political independence in the late 1950s and 
early 1960s, has experimented with a variety of political systems of governance 
ranging from multi-party democratic politics to single-party civilian 
authoritarian governments and military dictatorships. In fact, the sub-region 
has the highest incidence of military coups and interventions in civilian politics 
in Africa (Francis 2001:11). The combined effects of the end of the Cold War 
and the negative effects of globalisation, coupled with the nature of domestic 
politics based on neo-patrimonialism, have led to state collapse and civil wars 
as in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau, Mali, Niger and Côte d’Ivoire, hence 
3 The Anglophone countries include: Sierra Leone, Ghana, The Gambia, Liberia and Nigeria. 
The Francophone States include: Guinea, Senegal, Mali, Niger, Côte d’Ivoire, Burkina Faso, 
Mauritania, Benin and Togo; whilst the Lusophone countries comprise Guinea Bissau and 
Cape Verde. 
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Kaplan’s warning that the sub-region was emerging as the new threat and 
‘strategic danger’ to international peace and security. 
An important dimension of the nature of wars and armed conflicts in West 
Africa is the regionalisation of domestic civil wars. The majority of the wars 
have spilled over into neighbouring countries and the armed conflicts are not 
just localised within state borders. The regional dimensions and dynamics of 
violence often fuel and sustain these wars through the activities of the shadow 
economy and ‘peace spoilers’, i.e. those diverse interests that benefit from 
the exploitation of the war economies and would do anything to ensure the 
prolongation of the war. The involvement in the regionalised war economy of 
all the warring factions, who exploit the dysfunctional formal economy, the 
shifting alliances during armed conflict, and the long-standing regional political 
affiliations and informal commercial networks, all create the firm impression 
of a ‘bad neighbourhood’. Moreover the military and security threats in West 
Africa are not only limited to wars and armed conflicts, but also include criminal 
violence, intra-communal violence, mercenaries or ‘guns for hire’ – including 
Private Military Companies (PMCs) and Private Security Companies (PSCs) 
– plying their military expertise in the sub-region’s conflict zones, and the 
proliferation of small arms and light weapons. 
Evolution of ECOWAS integration and security 
regionalism   
The Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) has emerged as 
the most developed and complex sub-regional organisation in Africa. It was 
originally chartered as a regional integration and co-operation grouping on 
28 May 1975 with customs union and common market objectives. ECOWAS 
comprises fifteen countries at different levels of development and at diverse 
stages of state formation and nation building.4 A number of reasons were 
4 ECOWAS initially comprised 16 member states including Sierra Leone, Liberia, Nigeria, 
The Gambia, Senegal, Ghana, Togo, Benin, Côte d’Ivoire, Cape Verde, Guinea, Niger, 
Guinea Bissau, Burkina Faso, and Mali. Mauritania withdrew its membership of the 
Organisation in 2000 for a variety of political and strategic reasons. 
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responsible for the formation of ECOWAS. From an economic perspective, 
formation of ECOWAS integration was perceived as a national and regional 
development strategy. Politically, ECOWAS regionalism was assumed to serve as 
an instrument of foreign policy and a collective political bargaining bloc. Since 
its creation, the focus of ECOWAS integration and co-operation has been driven 
by developmental regionalism underpinned by market integration based on the 
liberal economic development strategy. 
Though the primary objective for the creation of ECOWAS was the attainment 
of regional economic development, the challenges of regional security threats 
have been a constant concern of ECOWAS countries. The domestic and external 
threats to state security and regime survival led to the signing of the 1978 
Protocol on Non-Aggression and the 1981 Protocol on Mutual Assistance in 
Defence. Political leaders such as Leopold Sedar Senghor of Senegal had argued 
that ‘development cannot be secured in a climate of insecurity’ and that hence 
there was the imperative that ‘we must among ourselves, establish a genuine West 
African solidarity pact to guard against external aggression’ (Adebi 2002:115). It 
was recognition of the link between regional peace, security and development 
that led to the establishment of the Francophone mutual defence pact, the Accord 
de Non-Aggression et d’Assistance en Matières de Defence (ANAD). 
An additional problem is that security was perceived by ECOWAS leaders in 
the traditional framework of military, national level-oriented, external security 
threats. This traditional conception of security perceived in external terms only 
focused on armed activities and the use, or threat of the use, of military force 
engineered and actively supported from outside the region, and with the potential 
to endanger regional peace and security. Domestic security threats from ethno-
religious conflicts, bad governance, political repression and insecurity created 
by the states’ military and security apparatus, were never considered as part of 
the threats to national and regional security. In effect, both the 1978 and 1981 
defence and military protocols were merely ‘regime protection’ strategies to serve 
the interests of ECOWAS leaders and to ‘insure’ them against both external and 
internal security threats. These defence protocols, therefore, provided a window 
of opportunity to clamp down, with military assistance from Community 
members, on internal opposition and coup attempts and to deal with political 
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instability or support for political dissidents in neighbouring countries. Though 
the case could be made that the defence protocols created the basis for ECOWAS 
to take on regional collective security and peacekeeping capability, it was in 
reality a mechanism for regime security and survival.
Institutionally, ECOWAS is governed by seven key structures including: the 
Authority of Heads of State and Government; the Council of Ministers; the 
Community Parliament; the Economic and Social Council; the Community 
Court of Justice; the Commission, and the ECOWAS Bank for Investment 
and Development (EBID). In addition, eight specialised agencies have been 
established to facilitate the work of ECOWAS integration, including the 
West African Gender Development Centre (EGDC), West African Health 
Organisation (WAHO), West African Monetary Agency (WAMA), Water 
Resource Co-ordination Unit (WRCU), West African Power Pool (WAPP) 
and the ECOWAS Brown Card. In fact, the new ECOWAS Commission has 
created the office of the Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security 
(PAPS), with three operational departments including: Political Affairs, Early 
Warning/Observation Monitoring Centre (ECOWARN), and Peacekeeping and 
Security. However it is important to recognise that some of these key governance 
institutions and specialised agencies are merely normative intentions because 
they are yet to be fully operational. In January 2007 the ECOWAS Secretariat 
was transformed into a Commission as part of a wider institutional reform 
of the Community. It is obvious that this transformation into a Commission 
is a mere African imitation of the European Union (EU) model. Given the 
track record of the ECOWAS Secretariat, it is doubtful whether this name 
change and institutional tinkering will have any meaningful impact on the 
peace, security and development lives of the people in the ECOWAS region. 
Notwithstanding the challenges of ECOWAS economic integration, the 1990s 
saw the development of a formal peace and security architecture to facilitate 
regional peacekeeping, peace support operations, and conflict management 
interventions. The ECOWAS Mechanism for Conflict Prevention, Management, 
Resolution, Peacekeeping and Security of 1999 is the first formal attempt to 
outline the institutional provision and legal mandate for ECOWAS response to 
peace and security. A notable feature of the mechanism is that it attempts to shift 
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the ECOWAS emphasis from conflict management (reactive and fire-brigade 
type interventions) to conflict prevention. 
ECOWAS peacekeeping and conflict stabilisation 
interventions in a ‘bad neighbourhood’
It was the bloody civil war in Liberia in 1989 that forced ECOWAS leaders to 
face the fact that they could no longer run away from the reality of developing a 
regional mechanism for peace, security and conflict management. The civil war in 
Liberia resulted in devastating regional consequences in terms of massive influx 
of refugees into neighbouring countries, large scale displacement of the internal 
population, gross violations of human rights, mass killings and widespread 
destruction of property. The bloody and violent civil war created a humanitarian 
disaster that directly threatened regional peace and security.
The civil war was led by Charles Taylor, leader of the National Patriotic Front 
of Liberia (NPFL), against the brutal dictatorship of President Samuel Doe. 
Charles Taylor’s insurgency was supported by other West African states such 
as Côte d’Ivoire and Burkina Faso, and by Colonel Gaddaffi of Libya. But the 
outbreak of the Liberian civil war did not attract immediate intervention by the 
international community, despite the unfolding humanitarian catastrophe. The 
United States (US), which had a special relationship with Liberia, was, during this 
period, preoccupied with the United Nations-backed international coalition in 
the Gulf war against Saddam Hussein’s Iraq. The United Nations (UN) was also 
over-burdened with its new post-Cold War responsibilities for the maintenance 
of international peace and security. It was this perception of international neglect 
of Africa that created the opportunity for the sub-regional hegemon, Nigeria, to 
assume political and military leadership in the management and resolution of the 
Liberian conflict.
Liberia: ECOMOG I
In an attempt to resolve the Liberian civil war, the ECOWAS summit in Banjul, 
The Gambia, established the ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee (SMC) 
on the recommendation of the Nigerian military Head of State, General Ibrahim 
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Babangida, as a regional mechanism to ‘settle disputes and conflict situations 
within the Community … and to look into inter-state dispute and conflicts which 
have a disruptive effect on normal life within the member states and on the smooth 
functioning of the Community’ (Nwachukwu 1991:104). This ad hoc committee5 
was mandated with the responsibility to mediate the resolution of the Liberian 
conflict. The beleaguered Liberian president, Samuel Doe, requested ECOWAS 
to send an intervention peacekeeping force into Liberia to forestall the increasing 
violence and tension and to ensure peaceful transitional environment (Francis 
2001:436). It was the decision of the ECOWAS Authority at an extra-session of 
the Community in August 1990 to accept the request of the embattled Liberian 
president that led to the formal establishment of ECOMOG. It is important to note 
that the mandate of ECOMOG was framed in the spirit of traditional peacekeeping 
or First Generation peacekeeping, whereby a peacekeeping force is deployed as a 
neutral inter-positionary force between two opposing national armies or warring 
factions, acting as a confidence building mechanism to prevent relapse into 
further conflict. But the Liberian conflict was a complex political emergency with 
different warring factions fighting to control the collapsed state, in which the very 
basic functions of the state and its governing institutions could not be performed. 
Therefore, when the ECOMOG peacekeeping and intervention force landed in 
August 1990, there was no peace to keep, no cease-fire to monitor nor the consent 
from the main warring faction, the NPFL, because there was no viable constituted 
government to grant consent. In such a complex conflict situation, traditional 
peacekeeping was of limited relevance, and ECOMOG could not serve as a neutral 
inter-positionary force. ECOMOG inevitably became embroiled in the conflict. 
What was needed in Liberia was something akin to a UN Charter Chapter VII 
peace enforcement  mandate because of the multi-dimensional nature of the 
peacekeeping and peace support operation challenges.7
5 SMC comprised Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, Togo, and later included Sierra Leone and 
Guinea.
6 With reference to ECOWAS Standing Mediation Committee 1990.
7 Multi-dimensional post-Cold War peacekeeping include delivery of humanitarian 
assistance, protection of safe havens, monitoring and protection of human rights, 
organising and supervising elections, repatriation of refugees. It has been described as 
Second Generation peacekeeping or complex peacekeeping. 
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Between 1991 and 1997, the ECOWAS Peace Plan for Liberia led to the 
deployment of the UN Observer Mission in Liberia (UNOMIL) with a Chapter 
VI peacekeeping mandate based on co-deployment with ECOMOG, the signing 
of several peace agreements such as Yamoussoukro (1991), Cotonuo (1993) and 
the Abuja Peace Accords (1995, 1996). These developments, under the auspices 
of ECOWAS, UN and OAU (Organisation of African Unity) led to the holding 
of general and presidential elections in 1997, which were won by Charles 
Taylor’s political party. The new Nigerian military head of state, General Sanni 
Abacha, was quick to recognise that without Taylor in the presidency of Liberia, 
there would be no peace. Though the elections were certified as free and fair 
by international observers, the reality was that it was an enforced peace that 
sacrificed issues of justice, reconciliation and fundamental grievances for the 
sake of a ‘quick-fix’ stability and fragile peace. 
By 1999 the fragile peace in Liberia unravelled and the situation was further 
aggravated by the violent and bloody civil war in neighbouring Sierra Leone. 
The military attacks by anti-Taylor forces such as LURD (Liberian United for 
Reconstruction and Development) and MODEL (Movement for Democracy in 
Liberia) and mounting international pressures on Taylor by the US, ECOWAS, 
AU (African Union) and other key players led to a negotiated political settlement 
whereby President Taylor was forced to leave office on 11 August 2003. The Accra 
Comprehensive Peace Agreement provided for the formation of a transitional 
government and the exile of Taylor to Nigeria, whilst an international arrest 
warrant was issued by the UN-backed Special Court for war crimes charges in 
Sierra Leone. Taylor is currently facing trial at The Hague for war crimes. 
To stabilise the security situation on the ground, US Marines and a contingent 
of ECOMIL (ECOWAS Mission in Liberia) troops were deployed after the 
exit of President Taylor. With an improved security situation on the ground, 
the UN Security Council adopted resolution 1509 which established a 15 000 
strong United Nations Mission in Liberia (UNMIL) with a Chapter VII peace 
enforcement mandate. The robust peacekeeping mandate was created in 
recognition of the complex political emergency situation in Liberia and the 
multi-dimensional nature of the peacekeeping challenges in post-war Liberia. 
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Sierra Leone: ECOMOG II
It did not take long for the spill over effect of the Liberian Civil War to be 
manifest in neighbouring Sierra Leone, when the Corporal Foday Sankoh-led 
Revolutionary United Front led a war against the All Peoples Congress (APC) 
party government under the leadership of President Joseph Momoh. For a variety 
of reasons, the RUF rebellion was directly supported by Charles Taylor’s NPFL, 
and covertly by other West Africa states such as Burkina Faso and Côte d’Ivoire, 
and Gaddaffi’s Libya. The Sankoh-Taylor axis was based on the understanding 
that the success of the Liberian civil war would be used as a staging post for 
the overthrow of the APC regime in Sierra Leone through rebel insurgence and 
that strategic mineral resources such as diamonds would be used to finance 
the war. Therefore in 1990 Charles Taylor opposed the use of the territory of 
Sierra Leone to facilitate the military operations of ECOMOG in Liberia. Taylor 
perceived this as a major obstacle in his bid to secure the presidency in Liberia, 
and therefore threatened to attack Sierra Leone.8 
It was the Armed Forces Revolutionary Council (AFRC) military coup led 
by Major Johnny Paul Koroma in May 1997 which overthrew the democratic 
government of President Kabbah that led to the ECOWAS and ECOMOG 
intervention in Sierra Leone. 
The ECOWAS Peace Plan for Sierra Leone facilitated the signing of peace 
agreements such as Abidjan (1996), Conakry (1997) and Lomé (1999) and the 
deployment of UN peacekeeping missions including UN Observer Mission in 
Sierra Leone (UNOMSIL, 1998) and UN Mission in Sierra Leone (UNAMSIL, 
1999). It was the involvement of the Nigerian-led ECOMOG II peace 
enforcement intervention that led to the overthrow of the AFRC military junta 
and the reinstatement of the government of President Kabbah in March 1998. 
The Nigerian-led pro-democracy intervention in Sierra Leone was not only 
an important development in the political history of West Africa, but also had 
important implications for the international relations of ECOWAS and Africa in 
8 See Francis 2001:110–112 for Taylor’s media interview with the BBC Focus on Africa 
Programme on 1 November 1990, in which he was threatening to attack Sierra Leone for 
allowing its territory to be used for ECOMOG military operations. 
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general, because this was the first time that a military junta was overthrown in 
the name of democracy and constitutional order. The ‘defence of democracy’ in 
Sierra Leone or the attempt to do an American-style reinstatement of Haitian 
President Aristide in 1994, was nothing more than an attempt to enhance the 
damaged domestic and international image of Nigeria and in particular its 
military head of state General Abacha. The Nigerian military leadership under 
Generals Babangida and Abacha had subverted the democratic wishes of the 
Nigerian populace in annulling the results of 12 June 1993 general elections, 
clamped down on all democratic forces in the country, and caused the 
suspension of Nigeria from the Commonwealth in 1995. Without democratic 
credentials and legitimacy, why would General Abacha defend democracy denied 
in his own country? The Sierra Leone civil war provided the opportunity for 
the Nigerian military leader to burnish his battered international image and to 
establish his domestic democratic credentials. The Sierra Leone pro-democracy 
adventure by General Abacha was a ploy to further strengthen his international 
credibility and silence his critics, in particular after the political settlement of 
the Liberian civil war in 1997. The co-deployment of ECOMOG and UNAMSIL, 
supported by the British military intervention (Operation Palliser), created the 
enabling environment for the end of the civil war in 2001 with a power-sharing 
government.
Guinea Bissau: ECOMOG III
The outbreak of the civil war in Guinea Bissau in 1998 dragged ECOMOG into 
another regional peacekeeping and conflict management adventure. This civil 
war threatened the national security of the immediate neighbouring states, i.e. 
Senegal and Guinea, as well as regional peace and security, further reinforcing 
the impression of a bad neighbourhood. Both Guinea and Senegal were already 
hosting thousands of refugees from the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone, 
and could not contemplate the consequences of yet another massive influx of 
refugees from Bissau. 
President Vieira asked Nigeria, the then chair of the ECOWAS Authority, for 
military intervention to help resolve the conflict. In response to Vieira’s request, 
ECOWAS Foreign and Defence ministers meeting in Abidjan in July 1998 
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recommended the following: ‘affirmed support of the democratically elected 
government of President Vieira and the need to restore his authority, employing 
a combination of dialogue, sanctions and use of force’ (Olawunmi 1998:17), 
and the establishment of an ECOWAS Committee of Seven to implement the 
decisions. By the time the committee could meet in August in Accra, Ghana, the 
Community of Portuguese Speaking Countries (CPLP) had already brokered 
a truce between the warring factions. Subsequently, a joint ECOWAS-CPLP 
meeting in August in Praia, Cape Verde, led to the signing of a ceasefire agreement 
between the parties and provided for the deployment of an international 
observer force to monitor the agreement. The Praia agreement was, however, 
shattered by continuous fighting for control of the capital city. The ECOWAS 
peace mediation led to the signing of a ceasefire agreement and the deployment 
of the Togolese-led ECOMOG III peacekeeping force in December 1998, with a 
Chapter VI mandate. 
The continued fighting between Vieira and the army commander virtually ended 
the mission of ECOMOG III, as the peacekeeping force refused to intervene in 
the fight for the control of the capital city or to assist Vieira’s forces. In addition, 
logistical and financial difficulties prevented the continued deployment of 
ECOMOG in Guinea Bissau. This therefore paved the way for the intervention 
of the UN by authorising the deployment of an assistance mission, the UN 
Peacebuilding Support Office in Guinea Bissau (UNOGBIS), which became 
operational in June 1999. The mandate of UNOGBIS was to promote national 
reconciliation, and assist in organising and supervising parliamentary and 
presidential elections (UN Security Council 1999). In Guinea Bissau, the UN 
only intervened after a rather messy and problematic ECOMOG intervention. 
The UN appointed a Special Representative of the Secretary-General (SRSG) to 
work with ECOWAS and, in collaboration with external partners, organised and 
supervised general and presidential elections. 
Côte d’Ivoire: ECOMOG IV
The bad neighbourhood dynamics and the spill over of civil conflicts in West 
Africa became evident in Côte d’Ivoire, long described as the ‘oasis of peace and 
prosperity’ in a region troubled by armed conflicts and political instability. 
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In December 1999, a military coup was led by the army chief, General Robert 
Guei, against President Bedie. General Guei, after a period of rule, organised 
democratic elections and his attempt to rig the result of the elections in his 
favour led to a people’s revolution that forced him out of power. Laurent Gbagbo 
of the Front Populaire Ivorien (FPI) was declared winner of the October 2000 
general elections. There were recurrent political clashes and instability between 
Guei and Gbagbo’s supporters, which eventually led to a military mutiny in 
September 2002 and the outbreak of a civil war. The country became divided in 
two, the pro-government south controlled by government forces and supporters, 
and the North-West controlled by three rebel factions including the main group, 
Movement Patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI), Ivorian Popular Movement for 
the Far West (MPIGO, comprising largely the Western Yacouba ethnic group) 
and the so-called New Forces – Movement for Justice and Peace (MJP). 
The French-brokered peace talks led to the signing of the Linas-Marcoussis 
Accord in January 2003 providing for a ceasefire which was largely favoured 
by the rebels, but not by government supporters. The peace agreement 
provided for the formation of a transitional power-sharing government that 
would be inclusive of both opposition political parties and rebel factions. The 
ceasefire paved the way for UN-authorised deployment of French troops and 
ECOWAS peacekeepers and the establishment of the UN Mission in Côte 
d’Ivoire (MINUCI). The ECOWAS Peace Plan for Côte d’Ivoire facilitated the 
deployment of ECOMICI (ECOMOG IV) – a largely Francophone dominated 
peacekeeping mission – and the formation of a power-sharing government 
between the New Forces rebels and the government. 
What factors determine ECOWAS effectiveness in peace 
and security?
A range of factors determine ECOWAS effectiveness in peace and security. These 
factors include: the regionalisation of domestic civil wars and how this serves 
as the impetus for action by regional leaders; political viability of the states 
and the willingness to lend themselves to the difficult and expensive activities 
of maintaining regional peace and security; organisational mandate and in 
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particular, clarifying the appropriateness of the mandate for peacekeeping 
interventions; the destructive role of peace ‘spoilers’ including the exploitation 
of war economies and how these constrain the effectiveness of the regional 
organisation. For the purposes of this article we have decided to focus on four key 
factors that may provide a better appreciation of the effectiveness of ECOWAS. 
1. Geo-politics and the challenges of common foreign and security 
policies
A major determinant for effectiveness of any regional organisation is the nature 
of geo-politics and the extent to which West African states have developed 
common foreign and security policies, and in particular ‘dependable expectation 
of peaceful change’ (Deutsch, Burrell and Kann 1957:6). Historically, ECOWAS 
integration has been plagued by the geo-politics of Anglophone, Francophone 
and Lusophone divides. In addition, the internal, external and conflict/
co-operation (amity-enmity) logics of regional integration have constantly 
played themselves out in the ECOWAS peace and security responses in the sub-
region. These historic colonial divisions coupled with the pursuit of strategic 
self-interests have often prevented the development and implementation of 
common values. In some cases, however, ECOWAS has co-operated on the basis 
of common values. The conflict management interventions in Liberia, Sierra 
Leone, Guinea Bissau and Cote d’Ivoire are a demonstrable track record of the 
development of common foreign and security policy. The main problem is the 
fact that the record of ECOWAS common foreign and security policies is based 
on ad hoc crisis management intervention responses dictated by the politics of 
‘do something now’. 
However, there is the acknowledged view that the norm of mutual 
interdependence and peaceful co-existence is emerging and that these are 
inextricably linked to peace and democratic consolidation with the potential 
to create democratic zones of peace over time in the sub-region. In addition, 
there is the emerging norm of common identity, the identity of West African 
unity as the mechanism or instrument for the resolution of regional problems. 
The norm of sub-regional unity and co-operative ethos, despite the perennial 
problem of the colonial divide, provided the opportunity for ECOWAS countries 
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to ‘do something’ about the peace and security problems within the region, 
and to develop viable mechanisms for the pacific settlement of disputes and 
conflict management. There is the explicit realisation that the containment and 
management of armed conflicts and violence potentially create disincentives 
for violence amongst member states, thereby positively contributing to the 
reduction of potential conflicts in the sub-region. There seems to be a positive 
correlation between building regional structures and the opportunities for 
reduction and prevention of violent conflict. 
ECOWAS has been challenged by a fundamental problem relating to differences 
in perception amongst member states on economic and security regionalism. 
This has presented considerable difficulties to ECOMOG operations. The 
majority of the Francophone and Lusophone states perceived ECOWAS as 
primarily an economic integration and development grouping and therefore 
had serious reservations about expansion into the regional peace, security and 
military domain. The Anglophone states however perceived ECOMOG as the 
security and military arm of ECOWAS’ economic and political integration, 
arguing that collective regional resources should be allocated for the 
maintenance of regional peace and security. This has led to the perception of 
‘Two ECOWAS’. To ameliorate the negative effects of the divisive geo-politics 
on regional peacekeeping and conflict management activities, valuable lessons 
were learnt from the Liberian peacekeeping and intervention. Based on this 
and in mediating the resolution of the Sierra Leone conflict, ECOWAS made a 
sustained effort to engage with the Francophone countries. For example, Côte 
d’Ivoire played a vital role in negotiating and hosting the first peace agreement 
for Sierra Leone. Togo had a critical involvement in negotiating and hosting 
the Lomé Peace Agreement of 1999 that formally ended the civil war in Sierra 
Leone. Burkina Faso was also instrumental in facilitating the involvement of the 
RUF in the Lomé peace process and in the mediation of the civil war in Côte 
d’Ivoire. The engagement with the Francophone group considerably reduced 
the tensions and divisions in terms of a common approach to regional peace and 
security and also the concerns about the dominance of Nigeria.
In discussing the politics of ECOMOG operations in relation to its effectiveness 
in regional peacekeeping and conflict management, Maxwell Khobe argues 
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that the governments of the troop-contributing countries often exercised 
considerable political control over their contingents, with deleterious operational 
implications. He explained that the ECOMOG Force Commander had no absolute 
operational command and control of the contingents, who were often deployed 
not according to the military appreciation of the Force Commander, but by their 
home governments. Therefore commanders of each contingent were answerable 
to both ECOMOG’s Force Commander and their own Chief of Defence Staff 
and Defence Ministers – who were often more powerful voices. Drawing from 
his practical experience in ECOMOG operations, General Khobe posited that the 
divisive geo-politics meant that troop-contributing countries could not agree on 
the regional approach to peacekeeping and conflict management, for instance, 
the use of force, or when such force could be used and for what purpose.9 
This led to a situation whereby some ECOWAS countries actively supported 
rebel factions and even made available their territories for military operations. 
As a military intervention force, ECOMOG had difficulties in operating a 
unified command and control structure due to its ad hoc nature and political 
elements that created the peacekeeping force. The considerable autonomy of 
the contingent commanders over the ECOMOG Force Commander, according 
to Khobe, led to situations whereby ‘contingent units were pulled out of their 
areas of deployment without the approval or even the knowledge of the force 
commander, thus endangering the deployment of flanking contingents. Some 
contingents have also at times refused to come to the aid of other contingents 
without the clearance of their home governments’ (Francis 2004:116). By all 
indications, this is a recipe for failure of regional peacekeeping and conflict 
management. In addition, ECOMOG operations have been plagued by all 
the usual problems faced by multinational peacekeeping and peace support 
operations, though the problems are far worse in the case of West Africa. These 
problems include language difficulties, lack of standardisation of equipment, 
different training standards, doctrines and staff procedures, poor sea and airlift 
capabilities, absence of vital air-to-ground support assets (in particular, ground 
attack helicopters more suited to the terrain), guerrilla warfare operations in 
West Africa, inadequate resources to deal with humanitarian problems, poor 
9 Quoted in Adebi 2002. 
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liaison with international relief agencies, and inadequate logistical support 
for some contingents (Khobe 2000:4). General Khobe’s seminal conclusion 
is a valuable outline explaining the problems and challenges that hinder the 
effectiveness of ECOWAS in peace and security.
2. Nigeria’s hegemonic leadership in ECOWAS peace and security
Nigeria’s leadership of ECOWAS and ECOMOG is crucial to the effectiveness of 
the regional organisation in peace and security. As the sub-regional hegemon, 
it was instrumental in the formation of ECOWAS and in the 1990s provided 
the politico-financial and military leadership to develop a regional collective 
peace and security system in the form of ECOMOG. Nigeria’s preponderance 
in the sub-region in terms of size, population, military, economic and political 
resources has inextricably linked the country’s national security to regional 
security. Three important developments have been the driving force for Nigeria’s 
leadership role in West Africa. 
Firstly, the Biafran civil war of 1967–70 and the role played by neighbouring 
countries, in particular, how they were used by extra-regional actors and powers 
as a staging post for support to the secessionist group. This was viewed by the 
government as an attempt to ‘balkanise’ the country, and it led to the realisation 
that the national security of Nigeria cannot be divorced from regional security 
and stability. It marked an important turning point in the political history 
of the country as it led to a paradigm shift in its post-independence foreign 
and security policy from ‘isolationism’ to ‘intervention’ in regional affairs. The 
post-civil war foreign policy therefore focused on three inter-related levels, i.e. 
promotion of regional security and stability through regional co-operation 
and integration, and leadership roles in African and international affairs. An 
important consideration was the intrusive role of France and the power politics 
with Nigeria for the dominance and control of West Africa. The motivation for 
the creation of ECOWAS was therefore to provide an instrument to promote 
Nigeria’s foreign and security policy in West Africa as well as to limit the role of 
France in the sub-region, a region considered by Nigeria as its political, strategic 
and economic sphere of influence. 
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Secondly, the discovery of oil and the OPEC (Organisation of Petroleum 
Exporting Countries) oil crisis of 1973, converted Nigeria into an indispensable 
oil producer for the West. Oil wealth provided the financial and economic 
resources to promote ambitious foreign and security policies, and the 
opportunity to flex its political and diplomatic muscles in regional, African and 
international affairs. With the end of the Cold War, Nigeria’s political, military 
and economic influence and dominance have increased in West Africa, supported 
by unprecedented oil revenues and windfalls from the demands for energy 
during and after the Gulf Wars of 1990 and 2003. Nigeria is among the World 
top 10 oil producers and oil-rich countries, but Nigeria is vulnerable to global 
economic trends and fluctuations in oil prices. Moreover, domestic political 
instability and insurgent military activities targeting oil workers, installations 
and production facilitates have affected Nigeria’s oil production and the revenue 
resources available for regional peace and security operations. 
Thirdly, the civil war experience and oil wealth have led to the evolution 
of a strategic culture in Nigeria’s foreign and security policy predisposed 
to interventionism in regional affairs. I have argued that the dominant 
interpretations of Nigeria’s foreign and security policy have been based on neo-
realist approaches, and have to a very large extent neglected particular domestic 
motivations and imperatives such as traditions, history, geographical location, 
values, attitudes, national achievements, and patterns of behaviour, and I have 
shown how all these impact on foreign and security policy-making (Francis 
2004:116). I further posit that a variety of Nigeria’s interventions in West Africa, 
whether military or non-military, sometimes conflicts with its economic and 
strategic interests, which therefore raises the question of the continued validity 
of the dominant power-political interpretations of the country’s foreign and 
security policy. In the analysis of Nigeria’s hegemonic role in West Africa and 
its leadership in building regional peace and security systems, it is important to 
consider the impact of strategic culture as an explanatory variable in providing 
an understanding of how Nigeria has linked its national security to regional 
security and why it has developed the attitude and behavioural patterns that 
assume that it is its ‘manifest destiny’ to police and intervene in West Africa. The 
dominance of the military establishment in the post-independence history of 
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Nigeria and the particular military culture and its predisposition to the threat 
and the use of force in regional peace and security matters seem to suggest the 
prevalence of the strategic culture of pro-interventionism in the sub-region. 
Nigeria’s political, military and financial leadership of ECOWAS and ECOMOG’s 
peacekeeping and conflict management interventions have been critical to the 
success, failure or effectiveness of the regional organisation’s forays into peace 
and security issues. From Liberia to Sierra Leone and Guinea Bissau to Côte 
d’Ivoire, Nigeria’s pivotal role has been crucial to the containment of these civil 
wars and the subsequent peace agreements. However, Nigeria has not been 
the only player. Other West African states and, in particular, the Francophone 
countries and external actors have played vital roles. The Bissau conflict was 
the first attempt by the Francophone states in West Africa to organise regional 
peacekeeping and conflict management deployment without the involvement 
of the dominant sub-regional player, Nigeria. But without Nigeria’s leadership 
and other internal and external factors, ECOMOG IV’s ceasefire monitoring and 
conflict stabilisation ended in failure. 
The ECOMOG experience in regional peacekeeping and conflict management 
demonstrates the relevance of the role and contribution of sub-regional hegemons 
in the maintenance of regional peace and security. Despite reservations about 
Nigeria’s preponderance, its dominant role continues in West Africa. Its presence 
and enforcement operations contributed to the management of the conflicts and 
the restoration of fragile stability. In general, the majority of West African states 
tend to accept Nigeria’s leadership in regional peacekeeping, but equally resent 
its unilateral military intervention and ‘gun boat’ diplomacy. This illustrates that 
a regional collective security mechanism, led by a sub-regional hegemon, has 
to be sensitive to reservations about threats to sovereignty by member states. 
Concerns about Nigeria’s preponderance and ‘pax Nigeriana’ by smaller states 
have been persistent. In fact, some states perceived ECOMOG as an instrument 
of Nigerian foreign and security policy. This provided opportunities for extra-
regional actors, with strategic interests in West Africa, to discourage some 
ECOWAS states from participation in the Nigerian-led regional peacekeeping 
force, hence undermining the effectiveness of ECOWAS in peace and security. 
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In the post-Cold war era the security vacuum created in West Africa has given 
Nigeria increasing opportunities to play a dominant role in the maintenance 
of regional peace and security. But Nigeria’s military capability is stretched 
in foreign and domestic deployments to contain ethno-religious instigated 
conflicts. In addition, the decades of poor socio-economic conditions and 
bad management of the economy have also weakened the resource base of 
Nigeria and in effect its ability to play an increasing role in regional peace and 
security. Furthermore, democratic governance in the post-military era of 1999 
has introduced constitutional and democratic accountability constraints. For 
instance, troop deployment in regional conflicts now has to be approved by 
the Nigerian House of Representatives. Additionally, the casualties suffered by 
the Nigeria-led ECOMOG in regional peacekeeping and conflict management 
operations have become acrimonious domestic political issues. Increasingly 
domestic public opinion not only raises concerns about Nigerian casualties 
in foreign military adventures, but also questions the rationale of diverting 
millions of dollars from domestic socio-economic development to regional 
peace and security activities. This raises the issue of sustainability of regional 
peacekeeping and conflict management operations by largely underdeveloped 
and cash-strapped economies in West Africa. Based on the analysis of Nigeria’s 
leadership role in both ECOWAS and ECOMOG, it is reasonable to conclude 
that without the involvement and commitment of the sub-regional hegemon, 
ECOWAS participation and effectiveness in regional peace and security activities 
will be considerably limited, bearing in mind that ECOWAS has no standing 
army nor any military logistical facilities and as such has to rely on member 
states, in particular, Nigeria, for troop contribution. 
3. External pivotal states / foreign powers and the UN in ECOWAS 
peace and security
External actors, and in particular, external pivotal states and the UN are of 
vital importance in understanding the effectiveness of ECOWAS in peace and 
security. External support is central to the effectiveness of the ECOWAS-led 
peace and security initiatives. The US support in Liberia, Britain in Sierra Leone, 
CPLP in Guinea Bissau and France in Côte d’Ivoire, the UN and other key donor 
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agencies and intergovernmental institutions such as the EU, African Union, and 
Commonwealth were crucial in negotiating the civil war peace settlements, 
supporting ECOWAS political and diplomatic activities, ECOMOG’s 
peacekeeping and peace enforcement operations, and post-war peacebuilding 
and reconstruction in West Africa. However, the conflict of interest of extra-
regional actors and Western governments involved in the management of civil 
wars in the region has created obstacles for troop deployment, reinforcement 
and logistical support for ECOMOG peacekeeping operations. Despite this, 
the general consensus at the level of the international community is that there 
is a need to support and capacitate the Africa-led approaches to managing 
and resolving conflicts on the continent. The prevailing view is that the 
challenges posed by contemporary globalisation, the war on terrorism and the 
regionalisation of domestic civil wars mean that wars and armed conflicts in 
Africa inevitably affect other parts of the world in diverse ways, hence it is in 
the interest of the West or the international community to support African 
approaches to African problems in peace and security.
The majority of the external powers intervening in peace and security in West 
Africa do so because of historic and colonial reasons. All the ECOWAS states 
have traditional bilateral military and defence arrangements with their former 
colonial masters. In crisis situations, the strategic response of the majority 
of ECOWAS states is to turn to their former colonial masters for help. This 
traditional response ‘mentality’ of ECOWAS states therefore creates a conflict 
of interest between ECOWAS regional response to peace and security and that 
of external pivotal states’ unilateral interventions. For its part, the EU has long-
standing historic links with West Africa through colonialism, bilateral political, 
socio-economic and commercial partnerships through the Accra Comprehensive 
Peace and the Cotonou agreements. Since 1996, the EU has contributed 
€1.9 million to support the peace and security activities of ECOWAS. The 
justification is that this is part of its conflict prevention and peacebuilding 
strategic policy framed as structural stability (European Commission 1996). 
But external interventions in West Africa have also been criticised because they 
have, in some ways, constrained or undermined the effectiveness of ECOWAS in 
regional peace and security. Though the EU’s financial, political and diplomatic 
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support has been welcomed, its peace, security and conflict related interventions 
have been rather disjointed and contradictory.10 In addition, external conflict 
and development interventions in West Africa have been generally criticised 
because they are often based on a short-term, quick fix and exit strategy 
orientation. They do not address the fundamental problems at the root of the 
conflicts, nor do they develop strategies with a long-term focus on durable 
peace and sustainable development. Furthermore, the majority of the conflict 
and development interventions are designed for the attention of international 
media and largely based on the notions of a liberal peace project, so that there 
is hardly any opportunity for domestic and local input into the external peace 
and security response activities. External actors therefore play a dual role, on one 
hand they contribute to and strengthen the effectiveness of ECOWAS peace and 
security and on the other hand, they potentially undermine the effectiveness of 
the regional organisation in peace and security. 
The UN has been a critical and major player in West Africa and, as such its role 
is crucial to the understanding of the effectiveness of ECOWAS in peace and 
security. In the West African complex political emergencies, the UN has deployed 
a range of peacekeeping and peace support operations in Liberia, Sierra Leone, 
Guinea Bissau, and Côte d’Ivoire. It has done so in collaboration with external 
pivotal states and ECOMOG within a co-deployment framework. Despite the 
relative success of the UN peacekeeping and peace support to ECOWAS and 
ECOMOG in West Africa, the nature of some of the peacekeeping mandates 
considerably undermined any form of effectiveness. For example, the traditional 
peacekeeping mandate assigned to UNOMIL was not only unsuitable to the 
conflict situation in Liberia but also reflected a lack of appreciation of the 
challenges faced by peacekeepers deployed in a complex political emergency. 
However, the co-deployment between UN and ECOMOG created a division of 
labour based on comparative advantages. UNOMIL and the SRSG mobilised 
political and diplomatic activities in support of the ECOWAS Peace Plan and 
conflict management in Liberia. In addition, the UN framework provided access 
10 For detailed criticisms of the EU response to conflict, security and peacebuilding in Africa, 
see Gilbert 2007:41–49. 
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to financial and logistical resources, and also provided political legitimacy for 
ECOMOG’s peace enforcement activities. Furthermore, UNOMIL provided 
peace support operations in organising and supervising, together with ECOWAS, 
OAU, EU and key western governments, parliamentary and presidential 
elections. The US provided the sum of US$25 million for the Liberian electoral 
and post-war reconstruction. And on the other hand, ECOMOG undertook 
enforcement operations, disarmament of warring factions, monitoring of 
borders to police the arms embargo, and provision of security during general 
elections. The result of this co-deployment experiment, despite its limitations, 
according to Adebi (2002:83), was a ‘string of success in every important aspect 
of the Liberian peace process: diplomacy, disarmament and elections’. The 
co-deployment strategy provided a new framework for burden sharing and 
sharing of responsibilities between the UN and regional organisations in the 
maintenance of international peace and security. Co-deployment peacekeeping 
in Liberia largely succeeded in stopping the killings, provided access for the 
delivery of humanitarian assistance and the disarmament, rehabilitation and 
re-integration of warring factions. Despite the limitations and dangers inherent 
in co-deployment, it has been lauded as a model for the future of peacekeeping in 
Africa (Adebi 2002:83). Kofi Annan, in support of the Liberian co-deployment, 
stated that ‘we developed a new form of co-operation for the resolution of 
other conflicts whether in Africa or elsewhere’ (Francis 2000:189). However, the 
co-deployment experiment could not function effectively as planned because 
of the existence of parallel command structures, and though UNOMIL was 
supposed to act in a supervisory role over ECOMOG, the military exigencies 
on the ground often dictated the nature of the supervisory role. As long as 
UNOMIL restricted itself to traditional peacekeeping in a complex conflict 
situation, ECOMOG as the primary peace enforcement agency often held the 
upper hand and invariably reduced UNOMIL to a secondary position. There 
was, in effect, no verifiable body to monitor the activities of ECOMOG, thus 
Adebi laments that ‘the subordination of regional command structures to global 
authority was neither attempted nor achieved by UNOMIL’ (Adebi 2000:83). 
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4. Quality of leadership of regional organisation
Leadership of the regional organisation and lead nations, in particular, the 
dominant state, Nigeria, is key to the effectiveness of ECOWAS in peace and 
security. General Yakubo Gowan’s leadership of Nigeria in the 1970s was crucial 
to the establishment of ECOWAS. Similarly, General Babangida’s instrumental 
leadership led to the creation of ECOMOG. In the 1990s, it was the political 
leadership of key West African leaders, in particular, the then Nigerian military 
leader, General Babangida, that made it possible for ECOWAS to intervene 
in regional peace, conflict and security issues. As a military dictator, with 
preponderant military resources and might, financial capacity and political 
influence, General Babangida effectively directed the creation of ECOMOG, 
citing the imperative of Nigeria’s foreign and security policy, as the justification 
for the establishment of the regional peacekeeping and intervention force. 
The rest of the ECOWAS member states were simply requested to support the 
‘regional initiative’ and those reluctant to do so, mainly Francophone states, 
were cajoled and ‘bribed’ with preferential oil shipments to convince them to 
join the regional military adventure.
How does leadership of ECOWAS in peace and security translate on the ground 
in practical terms? Between 1990 and 2003, ECOWAS had two proactive 
Executive Secretaries in the persons of Dr. Abass Bundu and Dr. Mohamed 
Ibn Chambers. The quality of their leadership made it possible to translate the 
political commitments of the heads of state and government of ECOWAS into 
practical military and operational peacekeeping and peace support operations 
deployment, including the effort to mediate political settlement of the civil 
wars in West Africa. Both Executive Secretaries have been involved in the civil 
war peace settlements that led to the management and political settlement of 
the wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Côte d’Ivoire. It is perhaps at the military 
level of ECOMOG peacekeeping and conflict management that the quality of 
leadership is more important. Between 1990 and 1998, ECOWAS appointed 
nine ECOWAS Field Commanders, all with varying degrees of effectiveness in 
the implementation of the ECOWAS peace and security mandate in each of the 
war-torn countries. After the debacle of September 1990 whereby the de facto 
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president of Liberia, Samuel Doe, was captured under the watchful eyes of 
ECOMOG and killed by the INPFL (Independent National Patriotic Front of 
Liberia), Lt. Gen. Quainoo (Ghanaian) was replaced by Maj. Gen. Dongoyaro 
(Nigerian), who rapidly developed a reputation as a no-nonsense military 
peace enforcer in Liberia. Despite the fact that ECOMOG’s initial peacekeeping 
deployment was given a Chapter VI mandate, Gen. Dongoyaro was often 
prepared, based on the military imperatives on the ground, and without the 
approval of his political masters, to expand the mandate of ECOMOG to peace 
enforcement, in a desperate bid to bring some level of stability and order to 
the war-ravaged country. Similarly, and at the height of the bloody civil war 
in Sierra Leone, Maj. Gen. Victor Malu was deployed between December 1996 
and January 1998 to lead the peace enforcement operations of ECOMOG in 
Sierra Leone. It is generally acknowledged in Sierra Leone that the quality of 
his military leadership of ECOMOG during this period forced the RUF to the 
negotiating table and the reinstatement of the government of President Kabbah. 
However, academics are divided as to whether the agency is more important 
than structure in the effectiveness of not only foreign policy but also regional 
organisations in responding to peace and security issues.11 
Conclusion 
In this article, I have critically outlined the evolution of ECOWAS and its 
expansion into the peace and security domain in the form of ECOMOG 
peacekeeping and peace support operations. But if ECOMOG is to serve as a 
permanent regional peacekeeping and conflict management mechanism and 
become part of the proposed African Union African Standby Force (ASF), there 
are valuable lessons to learn from its West African operations. For instance, the ad 
hoc nature of its deployment did not provide time enough for proper logistical 
planning and resourcing of the operations. The improvisatory nature of its 
creations also has implications for the lack of clarity of its mandate, especially 
relating to peacekeeping and peace enforcement. The 1999 Protocol on Regional 
11 For further analysis of the agency-structure debate in international relations, see Brown 
1997:73–84. 
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Peacekeeping, Conflict Management and Security Mechanism was therefore an 
attempt to respond to the problems, challenges and opportunities arising from 
the ECOMOG experience since 1990. But the adoption of the protocol did not 
have any conceivable impact on the management of the conflicts after 1999. 
A question raised by many political analysts and media commentators focuses 
on the real reasons that motivated the ECOWAS leadership to venture into the 
difficult arena of regional peacekeeping and conflict management. This question 
is at the centre of ‘why’ and ‘how’ ECOWAS can be effective in regional peace 
and security issues, in particular, if it is driven by the whims and preferences 
of the dominant state – Nigeria. A more persuasive reason for the ECOWAS 
unusual regional ‘collective’ peacekeeping or ‘coalition of willing states’, was the 
threat posed by rebel insurgency to the security and survival of the regimes in the 
sub-region. Insurgency or guerrilla warfare was a relatively new phenomenon in 
post-Cold War West Africa. It presented an alternative to military coups and 
access to state power and its patrimonial resources. Since the majority of the 
regimes were of questionable legitimacy and democratic credentials, the rally 
of ECOWAS leaders under the umbrella of ‘regional collective security’ and 
peacekeeping in Liberia was an attempt to discourage the ‘power of the Liberian 
example’ and, by the same token, protect and secure the survival of their regimes. 
The official view was that ECOMOG was acting within its constituted mandate 
as provided for in the 1981 defence protocol, by responding to a request from a 
member state invaded by ‘foreign-backed’ forces. A more credible reason was the 
perceived threat to the national security of Nigeria and the implications for its 
foreign and security policy. The Nigerian president, General Babangida, captured 
the strategic culture of pro-interventionism in a statement on the Liberian 
crisis in 1990 when he stated that ‘When certain events occur in the sub-region 
depending on their intensity and magnitude, which are bound to affect Nigeria’s 
politico-military and socio-economic environment, we should not stand by as 
helpless and hopeless spectators’ (Francis 2001:42). Nigeria’s leadership was 
also motivated by the need to limit, contain and discourage some Francophone 
countries that were supporting the NPFL rebel insurgency in Liberia. Always 
looking for an opportunity to demonstrate its benevolent hegemonic leadership 
in West Africa, the perceived international neglect of Africa also provided the 
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international environment for Nigeria to develop and put into practice the 
much-touted ‘Try Africa First’ approach to conflict management and resolution. 
Therefore in evaluating ECOWAS effectiveness in regional peace and security 
issues, there are key issues worthy of consideration and they are: the geo-
politics of West Africa and its constraints on the development and practice of 
common foreign and security policies; the leadership role of Nigeria; the role 
and contribution of extra-regional actors such as the former colonial powers 
and the UN, and the quality of leadership of both ECOWAS and ECOMOG. 
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